Nowadays, a range of slogans are being raised about the upcoming elections. Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently said that abstaining from participation is akin to surrendering to “evil.” Head of the Fatah Alliance bloc in parliament, Hadi al-Ameri said the ballot is a “battle for survival.” Meanwhile, leader of the Iran-aligned Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq Iraqi armed group, Qais al-Khazali, has warned of a “dangerous project for Iraq,” urging people to participate.
The calls of the three politicians - who are senior figures in the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework - seem to be an indirect opposition to the recommendations of head of the National Shiite Movement, Muqtada al-Sadr. The influential Shiite cleric in March announced his movement would boycott the 2025 elections, citing widespread corruption and the flawed nature of Iraq’s political system.
For his part, sitting Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani - who was notably backed by the Coordination Framework to premiership in October 2022 - has adopted a different tone. The politician who has not shied down from expressing his push for another term in office, has appealed to voters to let him complete his “unfinished work.”
Ultimately, these slogans all share the same goal: to push people to go to the ballot boxes, which is one of the greatest challenges posed ahead of the November ballot, yet not the only one. The central question is Iraq is heading toward elections amid a state of strategic uncertainty.
In the short term - particularly over the next year - the situation will be decisive. It will determine whether Iraq’s political landscape shifts toward improvement or drifts into renewed instability. This period will serve as a crucial test of whether, following the elections - and amid internal conflicts, lingering tensions and regional confrontations - the country is expected to move toward greater complexity or successfully navigate this turbulent phase.
Will the “Iraq First” strategy work in times of crisis?
The slogan “Iraq First,” which is being championed by Sudani, may have been inspired from US President Donald Trump’s “America First” slogan. Though it might serve as a useful electoral message, it is unlikely it will hold up during potential future tensions. The slogan implies that Baghdad would prioritize its own interests amid regional turmoil and will remain on the sidelines. In the wake of the 12-day war that erupted between Israel and Iran in mid-June, Sudani charged he curbed Iraqi armed groups - aligned with the Iran-led Axis of Resistance - from launching drone and missile attacks against Israel 29 times. His stated aim was to prevent a spillover of the conflict into Iraq.
Although Sudani’s position on this issue - similar to his handling of ties with the new Syrian leadership headed by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa - differs from that of the leaders of armed factions and political groups.
Nonetheless, Iraq’s staying on the sidelines of the 12-day war was likely more an American-Iranian product than by Iraq’s own desire. None of the principal actors had sought to transfer the war to Iraqi territories, but both Israel and Iran violated Iraqi airspace to carry out their operations. Israeli aircrafts and Iranian missiles were both shot through Iraqi skies. Yet, amid ongoing discussions about the prospects of war or non-war, Iraq’s strategic importance in regional calculations has clearly grown - making the task of the next prime minister even more complex.
Another issue to keep in mind is the reinstatement of six United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran, which if strictly enforced, would mean a harsher economic environment, new obstacles to oil sales, restricted access to the US greenback and greater difficulty in purchasing weapons. Oil-rich Iraq has in the past couple of years emerged as having critical importance to Tehran. This is especially true considering Iran’s location between the Taliban-led Afghanistan to its east and the Israel-allied Azerbaijan to its north.
However, Baghdad is also stuck between a rock and a very hard place, especially in light of the heightened American scrutiny. Just days ago, the US Treasury Department sanctioned the al-Muhandis General Company (MGC) - a publicly-owned multisector company - and several Iraqi bank executives, citing reported ties to Iran-aligned armed groups. Previously, for the same reason, it had restricted Visa and Mastercard services at certain Iraqi banks, noting that Iran could no longer bypass sanctions by selling oil through Iraq.
Despite these pressures, Iraq remains one of Iran’s last strategic lifelines - one Iran cannot easily abandon under US pressure. Beyond its economic significance, Iraq’s transit role has become increasingly central to Iran’s evolving regional strategy.
In general, it appears that the main lines of Iran’s policy after the 12-day war include continued cooperation with China and Russia, strengthening regional relationship networks, maintaining influence in Iraq and finding a resolution to the missile confrontation.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has stated that his country’s conflict with the US has “no solution,” adding that those who advocate dialogue with Washington are short-sighted. This position seems to reject comments from the reformist camp in Iran and figures such as former Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, who argue that reducing tensions with the US is a must.
At the same time, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed Ali Larijani secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). The moderate former parliament speaker (2008-20) is widely regarded as one of the principal architects of Iran's “Look East” policy. He further played a significant role in formulating both Iran’s 25-year cooperation agreement with China and its 20-year strategic agreement with Russia.
Larijani notably replaced Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian - a seasoned commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This move, along with the addition of former SNSC secretary Ali Shamkhani and ex-secretary for the SNSC and hardline former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili to the newly-formed Defense Council - a specialized, high-level military and security body established under the authority of SNSC - may signal that Iran’s domestic policy is leaning toward the ultra-conservative faction - of whom Jalili may be a key representative - of the political establishment rather than the reformists.
At the strategic-military level, while Iranian officials continue to emphasize uranium enrichment and the extension of missile range, the country may now be prioritizing land and maritime strategies, regardless of whether open conflict occurs.
Shamkhani notably has a background as commander of Iran’s naval forces. Meanwhile, Larijani - a former IRGC military officer born in Iraq’s southern Najaf province - embodies Tehran’s enduring historical and cultural ties with Iraq. After assuming his position, Larijani made his first foreign visit to Iraq and Lebanon.
Likewise, Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament and also a former IRGC Brigadier General, declared, “If we don’t fight Israel in the [Israel-held] Golan [Heights, southeast of Lebanon, southwest of Syria], we will have to fight in [the town of] Jalawla [in the Khanaqin district of Iraq’s northeastern Diyala province].”
For his part, Larijani recently remarked in an interview that Iran does not create resistance groups but supports them. Taken together, these developments underscore the high level of importance that Iraq and subsequently the Kurdistan Region hold in Iran’s strategic calculus. Further proving the latter, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, during his address to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in late September, openly threatened that Iraqi armed groups would be targeted should they attack Israel, as he put it.
Iraq’s fear of Syria: The strengthening of clans and the possibility of an ISIS comeback
In late September, the US Department of Defense began relocating its forces from Iraq to the Kurdistan Region. On one hand, this move strengthened Sudani’s position against the rhetoric of armed groups that had made US withdrawal from Iraq a central condition. However, on the other hand, it may embolden Iran-aligned factions to operate more freely than before.
Washington described the redeployment as a “responsible transfer” - a pointed reference to the controversial US withdrawal from Afghanistan, which President Trump frequently criticized. Yet, this shift may draw attention to the possibility of another resurgence of Sunni groups in Iraq, especially now that a Sunni-Islamic authority is consolidating its foothold just across the border in Syria.
The US has also made a significant strategic shift - from the traditional “war on terror” toward selective engagement with groups it once blacklisted. In Afghanistan, Washington is reportedly seeking an arrangement with the Taliban over the Bagram Air Base, while in Syria, it has considered coordination with Syrian interim President Sharaa - previously known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, head of the now-dissolved Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) - to counter Iran’s regional influence. Such developments have created deep unease among Iraq’s Shiite leaders.
Meanwhile, the march of thousands of Syrian Bedouin tribal fighters toward the Druze-majority Suwayda province in July - although primarily a Syrian internal matter - had implications for Iraq, as many of these fighters have family ties across the border to Iraq. Beyond that, it can also be viewed as a potential model for a renewed Sunni political resurgence.
Recently, Sharaa appointed former HTS commander Jihad Issa al-Sheikh - also known as Abu Ahmad Zakour - as his advisor for tribal affairs. This move may signal the institutionalization of tribal influence in the politics of the new Syria. The tribes have already proven to be domestically useful for Sharaa to exert pressure on the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeast Syria (Rojava) and the Druze in the southern Suwayda province, but the question for Iraq is what might happen if Damascus one day employs these tribes as instruments of its foreign policy.
Beyond the tribal issue, the Islamic State (ISIS) remains a significant threat to Iraq. Approximately 1,500 ISIS fighters are believed to be operational in Iraq and Syria, while thousands more remain imprisoned in Syria. Around 30,800 individuals linked to ISIS - fighters and family members - are still held in the Roj and al-Hol camps under SDF control, including 8,072 Iraqis, despite several rounds of repatriation.
Iraq’s concern lies less with Syria’s present condition and more with its future trajectory - both in terms of ISIS and the growing tribal dynamics.
In response, Baghdad has begun constructing a border wall with Syria and is closely monitoring development; also, in the short term, the fate of the SDF is important. Questions such as whether the SDF, under a different name, will protect all or part of Syria's borders - like those proposals currently being discussed as a middle-ground solution between dissolving and maintaining the SDF - or whether it will be integrated into the Syrian army in some other way, whether a military force will be created for Bedouin tribes or not, are among the questions whose answers Iraq may also be interested in.
Conclusion
Fear and anxiety about the impact of regional developments on Iraq, the Sudani phenomenon, and Sadr’s boycott are among the most significant factors likely to shape the election results - issues that also draw the attention of regional and international actors.
Out of a total of 29,450,000 potential voters in Iraq, only 21,404,291 are officially eligible to vote and some 19 million are able to vote after having obtained their biometric voting cards. This means that approximately 10.45 million Iraqis will be excluded from participation.
Moreover, it remains uncertain what proportion of the remaining 19 million will actually cast their ballots. If, generally speaking, around one million voters abstain due to Sadr’s influence, and if overall turnout reaches about 50 percent - which would already be considered high - the final results would represent only one in three Iraqis. Such an outcome could pose a serious challenge to the legitimacy of the political system. The second point is how traditional Shiite parties - whom they had initially backed to premiership - would deal with him after he had now morphed into an important competitor. Some traditional Shiite groups in 2021 turned toward inactivity in the electoral competition with Sadr, and it appears that this time Sudani may also be able to discourage another segment of them, but that does not mean he can easily become prime minister for another tenure.
For Shiite groups, as well as for Kurds and Sunnis domestically - and for Turkey, Iran, Israel, the United States, Europe and the Gulf Arab states externally - the identity of Iraq’s next premier carries considerable importance. While current political dynamics may seem to favor Sudani, he is certain to face opposition from his Shiite rivals, even if he enjoys notable international support. Therefore, it is reasonable to anticipate intense post-election negotiations over the premiership, unless unexpected results emerge from the ballot boxes. Whatever the eventual outcome of both the elections and the ensuing negotiations, Iraq’s future continues to be overshadowed by a profound strategic uncertainty.
Ziryan Rojhelati is director of the Rudaw Research Center.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.