A deep rooted mistrust runs through the ethnic, religious, and cultural fabric of the Middle East. It is not the result of recent crises alone, but of a long history shaped by violence, repression, and political manipulation. Anyone looking today at Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen, or Iran can see a clear pattern: instability is no longer just the failure of politics. It has become one of its tools.
What once appeared as stability was, in reality, a fragile system built on authoritarian control. Leaders such as Saddam Hussein, the Assads, Gaddafi, and Mubarak maintained power through repression, intelligence networks, and the deliberate division of society. For decades, Western governments mistook this for order. In truth, it was enforced calm, a balance of fear that hid deeper conflicts. When these regimes weakened or collapsed, chaos did not replace stability. It revealed the instability that had always been there.
The roots of this dynamic go back to the aftermath of the First World War. European powers, especially Britain and France, drew borders based on strategic interests rather than social realities. The states that emerged were often internally fragile. Diversity was not integrated but suppressed. Over time, a political logic took hold that still defines the region: minority rights are seen as a threat, democracy as a loss of control, and pluralism as instability. In such a system, instability is not avoided. It is often tolerated or even encouraged, because it helps maintain power.
Syria offers one of the clearest examples. Decades of repression have left a society deeply traumatized and divided. With the fall of the Assad regime, hopes for political renewal briefly emerged. Yet instead of a transition toward a more inclusive order, a new structure of power has taken its place. Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa, has assumed control and is establishing a form of rule that in many ways mirrors the authoritarian systems of the past. Its ideology combines Islamist and Arab nationalist elements and is marked by systematic disregard for minority rights, often extending into open violence.
At the same time, this new leadership presents itself to the outside world as a force for order and security. Like previous regimes, it offers the West cooperation on security, migration control, and counterterrorism. And as before, these promises are met with a willingness to engage. Diplomatic outreach, political recognition, and symbolic gestures of approval in capitals such as Berlin, London, and Paris show how quickly familiar patterns return.
Meanwhile, Turkey continues to oppose Kurdish autonomy, Gulf states invest in religious and political influence, and Russia and Western actors pursue their own security and economic goals. Each actor speaks of stability. In reality, each is pursuing its own version of it, one that prioritizes influence over the well being of local populations.
The broader geopolitical picture becomes even clearer in the tensions between Iran, Israel, and the United States. Iran relies on asymmetric strategies, building influence through militias, proxy networks, and ideological alliances. Its goal is not necessarily a stable region, but one it can shape and control. By contrast, Israel and the United States are less interested in preserving the current order than in reshaping it. They view Iranian expansion as a central threat and aim to create a new balance of power that secures their strategic interests.
Energy plays a key role in this competition. The Middle East remains critical for oil and gas, water, as well as for major transport and trade routes. The struggle for influence is therefore also a struggle over resources and future energy systems. In this context, instability can serve a purpose. It weakens competing actors, shifts power balances, and creates new opportunities for influence.
Even within the West, there is no single approach. European countries tend to favor maintaining existing structures, even when they are fragile. For them, stability often means predictability. The United States and Israel, on the other hand, are more willing to accept instability as part of a transition toward a new order. Yet despite these different strategies, the outcome is strikingly similar: the region remains trapped in ongoing uncertainty, shaped either by preserved crises or by deliberate disruption.
Regional powers further intensify this dynamic through proxy conflicts. The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has long played out along the Sunni and Shiite divide. In countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, religion is often used as a political tool to secure influence. Instability, in turn, prevents the emergence of independent political alternatives and reinforces existing power structures.
There is a clear logic behind all of this. Unstable societies are easier to control. They rely on security forces, accept authoritarian leadership out of fear, and struggle to build lasting democratic structures. Conflict justifies surveillance, and threat justifies centralized power. The result is a self reinforcing cycle in which instability is not resolved, but continuously reproduced.
There is also a psychological dimension. Years of violence and repeated trauma leave deep marks. Mistrust becomes normal. Social cohesion weakens, and the ability to organize politically over the long term declines. A society focused on survival has little capacity for democratic development. Instability becomes part of everyday life, and in doing so, helps sustain authoritarian systems.
This leads to a difficult conclusion: instability in the Middle East is often not accidental. It is part of a broader political logic. Regional and international actors, despite their differences, share a common interest in control, influence, and access to resources. Whether by preserving old systems or reshaping them, the result is the same. Instability remains central to how the region is governed.
The key question is no longer how stability can be achieved. It is why it is so often prevented.
As long as instability serves power, it will continue, driven by regional actors and reinforced by international policy. Calling for stability without confronting this reality risks reinforcing the very dynamics it seeks to change.
The Middle East is not the product of historical accident. It is the result of political choices.
Dr. Jan Ilhan Kizilhan is a psychologist, author and publisher, an expert in psychotraumatology, trauma, terror and war, transcultural psychiatry, psychotherapy and migration.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.