United States President Donald Trump has set a two-month deadline for reaching an agreement - or facing confrontation - with Iran. Meanwhile, the Iranian leadership is hoping that, "by divine grace," a miracle will occur and cause their opponents to fall.
Amid these developments, regional dynamics are shifting. US-Iran talks – along with Turkey's accelerated push to dismantle the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the latter’s request to hold a congress in the presence of their jailed leader, Abdullah Ocalan, and Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa's efforts to “rebuild Syria" – suggest that in the current geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, speed – or the deliberate lack thereof - has become a strategic choice.
Political opportunities are no longer straightforward: for some, they are too early; and for others, they are far too late. This duality between acceleration and delay reflects how changes in timing can translate into changes in alliances and alter political balance. Amid all this, the pieces on the Kurdish political chessboard continue to move slowly.
Policies of speed and slowness in the superpowers' game
In today's geopolitical landscape, competition among global powers is increasingly shaped by the question of speed - who can move faster and who can exercise greater restraint. US President Trump precedes all those who move speedily. However, a serious question that arises is how can an issue like Iran's nuclear program – an unresolved dilemma that has troubled six US for more than 25 years since 1999 - be settled within Trump’s two-month deadline? Or how can the ongoing three-year-long Russia-Ukraine war can be concluded in a single day, as he claims? Likewise, resolving the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a complex endeavor, especially when Trump’s deadline for the release of hostages held by Hamas, previously set for the end of January this year, came and went without success. Part of Trump’s urgency policy may stem from a belief that if the United States maintains the current pace, it risks falling behind China.
While Trump pushes for fast resolutions, Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be in no hurry to end the war in Ukraine – a conflict that continues to burden the US and Europe financially and politically.
Meanwhile, Chinese President Xi Jinping is also proceeding cautiously, at a slower pace, saying that in the current situation, he favors stability, perhaps because the time factor is working to China’s favor.
China has laid out a long-term roadmap to become a global military and technological superpower, targeting key milestones in 2027, 2035, and 2049. In 2024, China's third aircraft carrier, Fujian (CV-18), began its sea trials. Similarly, it has developed the DF-27 hypersonic intercontinental missile with a range of 5000-8000 km that can reach deep into US territory. Beijing is also investing heavily in emerging sectors like artificial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum science, and biotechnology, and is planning to invest around 23 percent of its GDP in technology by 2026. In the realm of space, China has already surpassed Russia and is positioning itself as the US's primary competitor.
Trump is increasingly alarmed by China's growing dominance over valuable rare earth minerals, energy routes, and global supply chains. Accordingly, he appears focused on countering this influence, particularly by limiting China’s access to Middle Eastern resources, including Iran’s cheap oil, and attracting significant Saudi and Gulf investment to his country. Through the Abraham Accords and championing reconciliation between Turkey and Israel, Trump seemingly hopes to find more opportunities to counter China’s influence. This broader geopolitical strategy could directly affect the Kurdish question.
In this framework, Trump's push for a rapid US withdrawal from Syria may come with increased pressure for an agreement between the Kurdish forces in Syria and the new authorities in Damascus - echoing the role Washington played in facilitating the Jolani and Kobani agreements. He may also seek to accelerate a Turkish-PKK agreement and bolster the Kurdistan Region’s political influence in Iraq, especially as Baghdad approaches critical national elections at the end of 2025.
Kurds and the pieces of regional politics
US President Trump's two-month deadline for Iran, which as he says must result in either an agreement or confrontation, carries significant implications for the Kurds. Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei recently referenced a temporary agreement struck in 661 CE between the second Shia Imam, Hassan bin Ali, and his opponents. The reference may have been geared to appease the ultra-conservative camp within the Iranian political establishment Khamenei leads, which frequently censures the government of President Masoud Pezeshkian, over its negotiation efforts. However, Khamenei views political timing though an ideological-political lens, believing that everything happening now is transient and that power dynamics will one day shift in Iran’s favor.
Iran continues to leverage its relationship with China and Russia as strategic counterweights to US pressure, while hoping that Washington’s pressures on Tehran would not persist. Besides that, Tehran aims to navigate through without issues until October 2025 to eliminate the risk of international sanctions being reimposed. Meanwhile, Israel, wary of Trump's "America First" policy potentially limiting Washington's support, is pushing for swift action on Iran’s nuclear dossier.
Despite Iran highlighting its strategic relationship with China, the major gas purchase agreement with Russia and Moscow’s establishment of a new nuclear facility, it is highly unlikely that Trump, a businessman-politician, would agree to any deal that does not offer tangible economic benefits to the US, but allows China, Russia, or Europe to take advantage. As a result, the prospect of either agreement or confrontation between Tehran and Washington remains uncertain.
Should an agreement be reached – that might entail allowing American companies to access the Iranian economy – it could mark a turning point for Iran’s internal and external dynamics. This shift might create new opportunities for the Kurds, particularly in Eastern Kurdistan (Iranian Kurdistan) and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Conversely, if tensions erupt into open conflict, Kurdistan is likely to become entangled in the confrontation. The Zagros Mountains - central to Iran’s military geography and home to key Kurdish cities - would likely become a critical security zone. Tehran could intensify military and political control over these areas to preempt unrest or foreign intervention. Additionally, US military bases in the Kurdistan Region might once again come under threat from Iran-aligned militias based in Iraq or Iran itself. The Kurds, caught between shifting alliances and regional power plays, would once again find themselves on the front lines of a broader geopolitical struggle.
Quick but fragile reconstruction of Syria and the issue of PKK disarmament
Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa - who rose to prominence last year after the group he led, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, toppled the regime of Bashar al-Assad - wants to sever the logistical routes of the Iran-allied Hezbollah movement in Lebanon through Syria. However, the task has thus far proved very difficult and uneasy to achieve. Sharaa additionally ordered the closure of centers and headquarters belonging to Palestinian groups aligned with the Iran-led ‘Axis of Resistance’ in Damascus, and has arrested some figures from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Sharaa has further integrated most armed groups into the Syrian armed forces and in practice, few have truly disbanded.
To secure international support - particularly the lifting of sanctions and the release of billions in frozen assets - Sharaa is engaging cautiously with key internal actors, notably the Kurds and the Druze. In negotiations with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Sharaa initially aimed to resolve outstanding issues within three to four months, while the SDF anticipated a longer, multi-year process. The two sides ultimately agreed to resolve core disputes by the end of this year. However, tensions remain, particularly over the implementation of the Tishrin Dam agreement, the recognition of Kurdish-language education, and the outcomes of the recent pan-Kurdish unity conference in Qamishli. These unresolved matters expose the fragility of the March agreement signed between Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, which envisioned the integration of all civil and military institutions in northeast Syria - including border crossings, Qamishli International Airport, and oil and gas fields -under the Syrian state.
Complicating matters further, the militant group Ansar al-Sunna recently announced its intent to target officials of the former regime. This development threatens to undermine Sharaa’s efforts to convince the international community that radical Islamist factions will play no role in the new Syria. He also faces growing fears of an Alawite uprising that could destabilize his government from within.
Meanwhile, both Turkey and Israel are seeking to accelerate developments in Syria. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu views US President Trump’s first year in office as a strategic window to counter Iran, advance the Abraham Accords, and reshape Syria’s future security architecture. Turkey, too, is eager to see the SDF integrated into the Syrian army and to prevent the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish administration in northeast Syria. Beyond security concerns, Turkey sees Syria’s reconstruction as a lucrative economic opportunity - particularly for its influential construction sector, which makes up roughly 30 percent of the country’s GDP. This would be politically advantageous for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), whose base includes many construction companies. Iran, in contrast, appears to be quietly anticipating deterioration in Syria’s situation that could complicate matters for both Turkey and Israel.
In this situation, the pan-Kurdish unity conference in Qamishli was a belated yet important step for the Kurds, despite its facing many internal and external obstacles. Just as three flags were raised instead of one at the conference, the diverse perspectives were one obstacle, and the fate of the Turkey-Ocalan negotiations on PKK disarmament is another. Some Kurds may be miscalculating by expecting a resurgence of civil war in Syria as a strategic opportunity. While such a scenario is not impossible, the reality is that the Kurds have limited time to act. Moving too slowly may be just as costly as rushing. Expecting Israeli support for Kurdish ambitions could also be a strategic misstep. It is unlikely that Israel would risk potential reconciliation with Turkey in exchange for backing a costly and politically sensitive Kurdish cause.
While negotiations to end the long-standing conflict between Turkey and PKK are taking place, both sides are fighting a time battle. Ankara wants the PKK to disarm and dissolve itself in the near future. Devlet Bahceli has demanded that the PKK hold its congress early next month. Meanwhile, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, while facing obstacles with the Istanbul mayor and the Republican People’s Party (CHP), wants to resolve the PKK issue as soon as possible to use it as an important political achievement domestically, not to mention that it provides commercial opportunities and economic growth for his country in Syria and Iraq. However, it seems that the PKK is not in a hurry like Ankara. Therefore, it is likely that the current approach to resolving the PKK-Turkey conflict will not succeed in its present form - and if it does yield results, they are likely to be superficial. The issue will persist until both sides perceive themselves as having gained something meaningful. Moreover, the disarmament of the PKK is not solely a Turkish concern; it is also a significant issue for Iran. For years, the PKK’s presence in the mountainous border regions has served as a buffer, helping Iran prevent the emergence of anti-Iranian armed groups. A peace deal between Turkey and the PKK would leave Iran as the only major Middle Eastern power yet to address its own Kurdish question.
Conclusion
More than six months have passed since elections were held, yet the Kurdistan Regional Government has still not been formed. Meanwhile, another election -potentially reshaping Iraq’s political landscape - is less than seven months away. The fate of the next government may hinge on the types of alliances that emerge ahead of Iraq’s upcoming vote, much like the 2021 election, which dramatically altered the dynamic between the Kurdistan Region’s two main parties. If the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) fail to align, any future coalition government is likely to face persistent instability.
Additionally, shifting regional dynamics - particularly the outcome of Iran-U.S. negotiations - could play a decisive role in the timing and shape of the government formation process.
In today’s Middle East, speed and slowness are no longer simply temporal markers; they are tools of geopolitical strategy. Kurdish geography remains a central zone of influence for competing powers, and its political timelines are similarly divided between acceleration and delay. Navigating this complex environment with minimal risk will require a carefully calibrated sense of timing - and a strategic understanding of when to move quickly, and when to hold back.
Ziryan Rojhelati is director of the Rudaw Research Center.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.