ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - United States forces are set to withdraw from Iraq's federal areas by the end of September, but an American analyst told Rudaw on Friday that some troops are likely to be kept in the Kurdistan Region and northeast Syria (Rojava).
"It's very likely that US forces will remain in the Kurdistan Region, for sure, and probably in some parts of northeastern Syria. Probably the US will not remain in al-Asad. It won't go back there in a permanent way," said Michael Knights, senior fellow at The Washington Institute, referring to the Ain al-Asad airbase in western Iraq that has housed US troops for years.
He predicted that the US and Iraq will continue a military relationship, warning that Iraqi forces will not be able to fill the gap created by the American’s withdrawal.
"Iraqi security forces will not be able to fill the gap. I think the US will continue to provide a lot of intelligence and special forces support, even if the profile of our troops is lower,” he said.
He believes that if US troops leave and the Kurdistan Region needs them in future Washington will support Erbil. However, he added that the US will not come to the aid of an Iraq run by a prime minister with close ties with Iran-backed militia groups.
"The United States will be more likely to support the Kurdistan Region, which is a friendly government, and the United States will be more likely to come back and help an Iraqi government that was not led by a militia leader. So it's important that Iraq picks the right prime minister after the next election," he said.
Iraqi parliamentary polls are set for November 11.
The following is the full transcript of the interview with Michael Knights:
Rudaw: Last week saw the designation of four Hashd al-Shaabi groups (Popular Mobilization Forces, PMF). Before, they were actually specially designated terrorist groups and now they are designated as foreign terrorist organizations. What does this mean? What's the difference between these two categories of designation?
Michael Knights: It's a very good question. The primary difference between them is the new designation is stronger. It carries higher criminal charges within the US and it also allows US people who were wounded by Iranian-backed militias to sue individuals and go after their money. Why this matters is because it's very important to prevent some people based in the US who are associated with the [Iraqi Prime Minister] Sudani government from trying to lobby the United States government in favor of these militias. They're trying to get them delisted or they're trying to do them other favors. Well, this makes it illegal for US persons, that's green card holders, or citizens, or their property, to in any way try and support these kinds of groups within the PMF.
Were there any efforts by Iraqis in the last few years to delist these groups?
There's always efforts by some Iraqi Americans and also by some people sent from Baghdad to get the US to remove certain parties from the specially designated global terrorist list. Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, for instance, is led by an individual called Shibl al-Zaydi who has very strong interests in Iraq's telecommunications sector and he works closely with Lebanese Hezbollah. He often has individuals in the United States who are trying to cut a deal on his behalf.
So, meanwhile, in Iraq, when they are being designated, in their statement, they say that this is an honor for us. On the other hand, in the United States, they lobby to be delisted.
That's right. They put a brave face on it, but nobody likes it when their international assets begin to be attacked. When you have a foreign terrorist organization designation on you, your money in Turkey, in the Gulf, in [the] UK can be attacked and it makes it more difficult for you to send your family members to go to university abroad, for instance.
Mr. Knights, the relationship between Baghdad and Washington has been complicated, actually, in the last few months, especially when we talk about the Hashd al-Shaabi law. We always knew that the United States used to pressure the Iraqi government and the parliament on certain issues, but never as publicly as we've seen in the last few months. How do you describe current relations between Baghdad and Washington?
When the Hashd al-Shaabi law was nearly passed one day, I think it was a Saturday, it got very, very close to being passed and it was a surprise to Washington that it could be brought onto the parliamentary agenda so quickly without anybody noticing that they were going to do a final reading of the bill and pass the bill. That really mobilized Washington to say, we're giving you a strong warning. If you pass the Hashd al-Shaabi bill, it will change the relationship between Iraq and Washington forever. So don't try to sneak this past us without us noticing. You know now what the consequences will be if you do this. And that seemed to be effective in stopping the factions from trying to get it passed every single time parliament was meeting.
I personally know that officials from the United States actually pressured members of parliament, especially the Kurds, they told me that personally - not to attend any session of the parliament. And even as a joke in Baghdad, they told them that in summer Baghdad is too hot, stay in Kurdistan, it's kind of cooler there. My question is, why this pressure at this time, specifically when we talk about the current situation in the region that I will come to later, but why this big pressure for such a law? Why is the United States very sensitive about the Hashd al-Shaabi law?
I think as we head into elections in Iraq in November, everybody feels that there is, in the US government, everyone feels there's a chance to get a new prime minister, a new kind of government which is less connected to Iran. You know, obviously the Iranian factions will still have their seats in parliament, but when they come to pick a prime minister, they can pick somebody who is closer to the West and that will reduce the chance that Iraq will be hit by very serious sanctions in the future. And it will also give Iraq some protection against US or Israeli strikes on militia leaders. So the US is hoping that Iraq makes a good choice when it comes to its next prime minister. And, you know, this is one reason why the pressure is on right now. The US does not want this government under Sudani, who was picked by the Iran-backed militias, to pass the PMF law and turn the PMF into a permanent ministry with a permanent budget in every single year of financial budgeting in Iraq. The US wants to leave the decision of what to do with the PMF to the next government in the hope that the PMF will not be made into a permanent ministry, but instead will be slowly incorporated back into the Iraqi security agencies, like Ministry of Defense or Ministry of Interior.
Regarding Sudani, it's clear that Sudani is working to be re-elected and he is running in the next elections. How does the US view Sudani? Is Sudani being perceived by the United States as pro-Western or pro-Iranian?
In Washington, Sudani has serious problems because he is perceived as pro-Iranian. Everybody knows that he was put in position by leaders such as Qais al-Khazali, a US-designated terrorist, Hadi al-Amiri, whose movement, Badr, was formed by Iran, by the Revolutionary Guard. So nobody is fooled in Washington about where Sudani has come from. Sudani is constantly telling the Americans, ‘But I can change, I can be on your side now in the future.’ And the problem is that the Americans don't believe him. They know that this is just something that he's telling them in the lead up to the election so that he can get a second term in government. And after that, there's no guarantee that Sudani would be close to the Americans. In fact, it's more likely that he would turn back towards the Iranians and towards the groups that support him.
Another thing happening in Iraq is the US withdrawal. The United States is starting to withdraw from Iraq. And I mean Iraq without the Kurdistan Region. These troops will remain until next year. And then, as it's planned, there will be a withdrawal from Kurdistan, too. I was in Baghdad last week for a few days, and I talked to many politicians. Something that they are so afraid of was a tweet, actually, from the US embassy in Baghdad. While there was talk and news that the United States started to withdraw its troops from Baghdad and Ain al-Assad base, there was this tweet - I'm sure that you've seen it - a concern from the United States, as it was mentioned in the tweet of the Baghdad embassy, about al-Qaeda and ISIS. How did you perceive that tweet, actually, Mr. Knights?
So, the United States wants to continue counter-terrorism partnership with the Kurdistan Region, and also with federal Iraq, and also with elements in Syria, like the Syrian Democratic Forces. The US Pentagon, our intelligence community, and our government are very focused on making sure al-Qaeda and Daesh [ISIS] do not return. We've lost people fighting them. You've lost people fighting them. We've worked together and we have succeeded. And we want to finish the job. So, the US wants to remind everybody, our forces are in Iraq to help Iraq and the Kurdistan Region to finish off Islamic State and al-Qaeda. It's very likely that US forces will remain in the Kurdistan Region, for sure, and probably in some parts of northeastern Syria. Probably the US will not remain in al-Asad. It won't go back there in a permanent way. But I'll just say this, most Iraqi politicians understand that when the US left last time, we had ISIS come in within two and a half years and take over a third of Iraq. Even though that's not likely to happen so dramatically this time, there is still nervousness that if the US leaves, Iraqi security forces will not be able to fill the gap. I think the US will continue to provide a lot of intelligence and special forces support, even if the profile of our troops is lower.
Iraqis, especially the politicians, remember that. They don't have a good memory of the US withdrawal, especially in 2012, as you mentioned. We know what happened. And now, somehow, they perceive this tweet, as I heard from them, as a threat from the United States. Is this a threat or a reminder?
Well, it's a reminder that once before, the Iraqi government made a short-sighted decision to look good in front of the federal Iraqi public and they regretted it after a couple of years. Now, personally, I don't expect ISIS to come back like it did in 2014, because we do not have, at the moment, a major Syrian civil war. The Iraqi government and the security forces are in better condition than they were in 2013, 2014. But the US is warning, if you want our help against ISIS and al-Qaeda, we're here, keep us here. It's going to be a lot harder for us to come back later if we all have to leave.
Do you think if something happens in the region, it will be easy for Iraq, again, to ask the United States for support as Iraq asked in 2014? Because, on the other hand, the US is going to tell Iraqis, ‘Okay, I'm not returning, especially under Trump's administration, I'm not able to do this. Every time you need me, you bring me into your country, and I have to spend millions of dollars, billions of dollars, and then after, when I save you, then you kick me out and you start a demonstration on the streets.’ If something happens, what's your expectation for the United States response to a call from the Iraqi government for support?
Well, the United States will be more likely to support the Kurdistan Region, which is a friendly government, and the United States will be more likely to come back and help an Iraqi government that was not led by a militia leader. So it's important that Iraq picks the right prime minister after the next election. I think we will pull down to a small number of special forces advisors, but we will be ready to fly additional troops in for specific missions and if something really worrying is happening. And I think we know that the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is the most friendly location for us to reinforce, and the safest place where we can operate from.
And what about Syria? Will the United States keep its troops there?
Well, I think the difficulties of making a long-term deal between the new Syrian government and the Kurdish-led security forces in northeastern Syria is what is keeping the US there. If the US saw that Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces made a deal, then the US would feel like they could pull back into Kurdistan Region of Iraq, mostly. But the US will be held in northeastern Syria until the Syrian Democratic Forces can be absorbed into the new Syrian army with a degree of semi-autonomy in the northeast.
It's clear in the region that Iran doesn't have the power that it used to have, especially after October 7th and the domino effect of all what happened there. But when it comes to Iraq, many think that Iran doesn't have the same power in Iraq as it used to. And you are the best person to ask this question to. Does Iran have the same power and hegemony in Iraq as before?
Well, Iraq is much more important to Iran than it was two years ago. You know, if you look at, back then, the Iranians would say we control four Arab capitals: Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, and Sana'a. Well, they've lost Damascus and to some extent they've lost Beirut. Now, Baghdad is very important to the Iranians as a way to get around US sanctions, as a way to make money, and as a way to block incoming attacks and keep enemies away from its borders. So, you know, the problem is Iran is weaker than it was, but it's also more desperate to keep hold in Iraq. And that's why these elections are going to be very important. If the Iraqi people and particularly the leaders can make a good decision after these elections, then Iraq will be seen in Washington, DC. as a place that is not controlled by Iran. And of course, the Kurdistan Region is a place that we know will never be controlled by Iran because the Kurds are America's best friends in Iraq.
But when you say that it is not controlled by Iran, in the United States' perspective, what does this mean? Because Iran, if we go back to history, always had influence on Iraq. Even the leftists in Iraq, actually, all of the leftists back in the last century, were influenced by the leftists in Iran, the Tudeh [Party of Iran]. So it's not just the Shia militia groups that are being affected by Iran. Iran always used to have influence in Iraq. To what extent will this influence not be perceived by the United States as controlled?
So one of the things the Trump administration is quite good at is differentiating between normal influence of two countries that are neighbors and control by a foreign country. And this is why the Trump administration has been so focused on things like oil smuggling, the Iranians using Iraq to smuggle Iranian oil out into the world markets. Because this is a kind of control by the Iranians that is very harmful to Iraq. Now, when two nations cooperate in a way that is win-win, the US probably has no issue with that. Once Iran is taking value from Iraq and using it to fund terrorism, that's when the US gets very focused. And that's why the US has started to focus its sanctions on Iraq's oil export infrastructure. Because that is a very clear sign of negative control, of malign influence, as it's called, instead of just normal influence between two countries, two economies.
Trump's administration policy toward Iraq is not clear. Politicians, decision makers don't really understand what the clear policy of the United States toward Baghdad is now, especially under Trump's administration. Under Trump's administration, the United States doesn't have an ambassador in Baghdad. Some politicians actually perceive this as a sign from Washington to Baghdad, so they can translate it as, this is the kind of relationship that we have with you. What is Trump's policy toward Iraq?
You asked the right person, still quite close to the administration when it comes to their Iraq policymaking. And I should point out, the US doesn't have a full-time permanent ambassador in Saudi Arabia or Qatar either. And those are places where the US obviously has a very close relationship. So you've got to separate a little bit the way Trump is redesigning and reorganizing the US State Department, which is definitely difficult and makes it hard in a lot of parts of the world for the US to be fully represented. Iraq's not special in that regard. And there are a lot of places that are very important to the US that do not have an ambassador right now, full-time ambassador. So the Trump administration policy on Iraq inside the administration is very focused on Iran sanctions enforcement, making sure Iraq does not become a mouth through which Iran can breathe and eat. The second thing is trying to guide a better result out of the next Iraqi elections and to get a new prime minister in Iraq who is separate from the militias. The US is primarily using sanctions to do that. And it is signaling that if we have to protect our forces, our citizens with military strikes in Iraq, we always maintain the option to do that. Now, you might say that sounds like a very simple policy, not very elegant, not very sophisticated, but that's where we are with Iraq right now. The US is saying Iran is the problem in Iraq, fix that problem and we can be friends.
Regarding the Kurdistan Region, there were many attacks on the oil fields in the last few months, many political problems and financial problems with Baghdad. The Kurdistan Region always somehow relied on Washington, not just for military support, but also for political support. But I think now the United States somehow, when it comes to politics, doesn't pressure Baghdad or doesn't mediate between Baghdad and Erbil. Can the Kurdistan Region rely on the United States politically with Baghdad?
So I disagree with the premise here. If you look at the US behind the scenes, it's been very heavily involved in moving Baghdad from a position of no Kurdish oil exports to a position where we are now discussing how those oil exports will begin to flow, how money will get to Kurdistan and to the investors. And that has been low profile, but very, very intense diplomacy that's been going on now for nearly two years. And when Baghdad is so determined to stop the Kurdistan Region from having money, it's a big fight. It's a very heavy fight for the US to try and get Baghdad to start paying and keep paying, but we are making progress in that regard.
One thing I would say about security guarantee for the Kurdistan Region, if you look at individual drone attacks, it is very difficult to stop those, when just recently in Israel, the Ramon International Airport was struck by a Houthi drone. This is the best protected piece of airspace in the world, protected by both the United States and Israel, and the drone still gets through. So there is no 100 percent defense. And against small drone attacks coming from places like northern Iraq, it is very difficult to defend individual oil fields. But I'll just say this, many of your listeners will remember the days in 1996 when the Saddam [Hussein] forces invaded Erbil, when they overran numerous places within the core Kurdistan Region. Well, that's not going to happen now. And that didn't even happen after the terrible days in Kirkuk in October 2017. So the fundamental security of the Kurdistan Region is intact. The Kurdistan Region will not be wiped out of existence. The United States will not allow that to happen administratively by taking away your money or militarily by overrunning you. So the basic security is intact. It is difficult to protect against every single attack and deter every single attack coming into Kurdistan. And I am sorry that we can't always have missile defenses in the right place at the right time to protect all of our friends around the world.
I'm interested in knowing your opinion and your take on what happened in Sulaimani last month. Do you think this was a political disagreement between Lahur Sheikh Jangi and Bafel Talabani or a security issue or it's part of a bigger equation in the region?
I don't think it's part of a bigger equation, really. I think this is the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's internal business. I know both Kak Bafel and Kak Lahur and I'm really sad that they could not remain friends. And I know that the strength of the feeling between them is very, very angry, bitter. And I believe that Bafel, he feels he's defending himself from attacks. And I'm glad that Lahur is alive and I'm glad that he is seemingly being treated well. I hope this marks the end of this episode because the Sulaimani side needs to heal and the parties or the parts of the PUK need to come back together again. And there needs to be no external interference in their relations. But the Sulaimani side has always been a little bit more chaotic than we get on the Erbil and Duhok side of the Region. Politics are more loud, protests are more regular. And sometimes this kind of violence can happen between leaders there.
About the region, Israel and Iran, there is a ceasefire. Also, there is no document for this ceasefire, just a post on social media from Donald Trump. But we hear sometimes, actually in the last few weeks, that military leaders and officials in Iran always mention their readiness for the next phase of the war. The Israelis sometimes in the media, they mention that too. So actually in this region people fear that and many believe that this is only a pause and at a certain time, this war will resume again and it will restart. When you see the signs from Iran and also from Israel, do you think another phase of fighting and war between Iran and Israel is going to happen in this region?
I'm actually encouraged by what I've been seeing the last couple of months and I'll explain why. One option for the Iranians at this point was to take whatever remaining nuclear material they have, turn it into one or two bombs and test the bomb in secret and tell everybody now we have a nuclear bomb. That would have been a very dangerous development. Instead, what we seem to see the Iranians doing is saying, you can snap back UN sanctions on us, you can bomb us. We don't care. We are just going to keep going with our survival. Under sanctions, we are going to focus on regime security and keeping ourselves in power and we are not going to project power outwards. We're not going to start any new fights and this is very practical from the Iranians. They know the Trump administration will leave them alone if they just do nothing, don't do anything on the nuclear area, don't do any revenge attacks. They know that the Israelis are under some restraint from the Trump administration to not attack Israel [sic] again and break the peace. So I feel like we are headed into a period of maybe sustained Cold War. And for a region that's had such dramatic events, particularly since 2023, that's good enough. It means there's less likelihood of missiles and drones dropping in Kurdistan Region and less likelihood of US, Israel or Iran being involved in major military operations.
But do you think that the current government in Israel wants this? I mean, not wanting to start a war.
You know, I understand after seeing the Israelis striking out into Yemen, into Qatar even, and other places, it's easy to imagine that they just want to fight everywhere all the time, but that's not the case. The Israelis have made President Trump annoyed at them, very annoyed behind the scenes and under the surface with this attack on Doha. The Israelis undertook the attack in a way that made it difficult for the Americans to detect it and meant that once they warned the Americans, there was no way the attack could be called off because it was using a ballistic missile that you send it and it's gone. So the Israelis know that they probably don't have too many more options like that. The Israelis would need to see, they would need to find proof, let's say that the Iranians were trying to develop a nuclear weapon and then show that to the Americans and say, see, the Iranians are fooling you. Now, if President Trump sees strong evidence that the Iranians are about to test a nuclear weapon, that's different. But the Iranians are not stupid. They seem to be leaving the nuclear materials buried underground in Natanz and other places. They're not making any moves that could draw another set of attacks onto themselves. They need time to recover. So I think the trends are pointing towards the Israelis leaving the Iranians alone, mostly, and focusing instead on Houthis, Hamas in Gaza, and other actions in Lebanon and Syria.
So Iran is doing what it's known for, besides its rhetoric to the public. But behind the scenes, Iran is always, when it comes to politics, in very sensitive moments, smart and they know how to save themselves.
That's correct. And in the advice I give to commercial clients with Horizon Engage, we tell them that the signposts we're looking for in the coming weeks are basically how Iran responds to UN snapback [sanctions]. If the Iranians do nothing, then we know they want peace and are very cautious. If the Iranians, for instance, leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or completely end the UN inspections, then they are risking the return of Israeli strikes and maybe even US involvement. But what we expect to happen is that the Iranians will just let snapback go past in late September and nothing will happen. That will indicate that perhaps we're going to have some regional quiet for at least a few months.
The foreign minister of Syria is in Washington. They are seeking to lift the remaining sanctions on Syria. But meanwhile, Syria is facing many problems. From the south, there's this problem with Israel and the Druze. And it's clear that the Alawites are not very happy with the situation. The Kurds, actually, are very concerned. Meanwhile, you see Syria, somehow, [President] Ahmed al-Sharaa is relying on trying to get support from the United States. The Kurds, meanwhile, are trying to get support from the United States. What is the current policy of the United States towards Syria? Does Ahmed al-Sharaa have full support from the United States?
Well, we could probably say there's two policies for the United States in Syria right now. The old policy is the military, the US Pentagon. And, you know, the standing policy is that we back the Syrian Defence Forces [sic] in the northeast. We want counter-terrorism cooperation from all the parties in Syria against remaining elements of Daesh and al-Qaeda. But alongside that, we have the new Syria policy, which is run out of the US Embassy in Turkey by Trump's friend, Ambassador Thomas Barrack. And that new policy is about working with Turkey, working with Saudi Arabia and others to try and support the new Syrian government and get it back on its feet and keep it away from Russia and keep it away from Iran. And both of those policies are working at the same time. And, you know, it's not always easy.
But we can say this, the old policy of the US military supporting the Syrian Democratic Forces, that's not going to go away until the Damascus government demonstrates that it can work with the northeastern Syria Autonomous Administration and that the Damascus regime can also work with minorities in other parts of the country like the Druze. It's also going to require the US to make Israel a little bit quieter in Syria. Again, the US is kind of annoyed that the Israelis seem to be trying to destabilize the new Syria. The US, the Saudis, the Turks, the Qataris, everybody wants Syria to become more stable. And the Israelis must not be allowed to interfere with that.
But getting this stability and what the United States wants is to keep Syria away from Iran and Russian influence, does that mean sometimes turning a blind eye to what happened with the Druze, the killing, and with the Alawites?
Yes. I mean, look, the US turns a blind eye to many things. You know, in the years past, it turned a blind eye to the way that the Syrian Democratic Forces were run almost entirely by Kurds and sometimes had very bad relations with Arabs in northeastern Syria. And the US has had to turn a blind eye more recently to some of the actions of the Syrian government.
That's honestly part of doing business in a post-conflict state that is on the edge of civil war at all times. Everybody in that environment is making mistakes and everybody is losing control sometimes. What the US wants is to minimize the amount of outbreaks of violence and to reduce the amount of meddling by Israel, even in Syria today. So it's a difficult task and the US is trying through Embassy Turkey and through the military to keep the peace process in Syria together.