ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - As Iran expands use of state-approved platforms and limited government-controlled internet access following the war with the US and Israel, many Iranians are turning to underground VPN networks to stay connected, with prolonged restrictions increasingly disrupting businesses, communication, and daily life.
I visited a small shop on a main street that sells SIM cards and internet services. Three or four people were inside. I greeted them. Two men working there responded without looking up from their screens.
"So, could there be anything that might help us?" I asked. One of them looked up and recognized me. "Unfortunately, no," he responded with a smile. "My work is urgent, even something limited…” I said.
"There isn't. You know how the situation is,” he replied.
I said goodbye and left.
The conversation felt more like one between people trading illegal substances. In reality, I was trying to buy a VPN, something that has effectively become prohibited in Iran in recent months.
More than two months have passed since the start of the US-Iran war on February 28. Since then, access to the global internet has been heavily restricted in Iran.
Over the past 25 years, internet access has gradually expanded across the country, though never at the level of openness seen elsewhere. Platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, and Telegram, along with many international media websites, were already filtered under normal circumstances. Still, people had become accustomed to bypassing restrictions using VPNs and other filtering circumvention tools.
In the past decade, particularly after the development of digital banking systems and social media platforms, Iran’s digital economy grew rapidly. Online services expanded into commerce, education, the arts, and other sectors, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated internet-based services.
During nationwide protests in January, Iranian authorities imposed a near-total internet blackout across the country. Less than a month after access partially returned, the outbreak of war with the US and Israel brought another round of severe restrictions.
The repeated shutdowns have placed enormous pressure on Iran’s digital economy. The issue has become a major public concern, with demands growing daily for internet access to return to normal.
Iranian Social Affairs Minister Ahmad Meydari said 50 days after the war that "due to the war situation, one million businesses disappeared and two million people became unemployed."
Iran's Digital Commerce Council also said in a recent statement that "in the three months of winter, 120,000 billion tomans ($800 million) in damages hit the digital economy sector."
For years, Iranian authorities have prepared for this kind of isolation by developing the National Information Network (NIN), a domestic intranet system designed to keep banking, government, and administrative services operational even while disconnected from the wider global internet.
While many citizens had long resisted using state-approved platforms, recent restrictions have forced increasing numbers of people onto local applications such as Rubika and Eitaa.
Still, many needs cannot be met through Iran’s internal network. Large numbers of people - including both users of government platforms and those who avoid them - continue searching for ways to access unrestricted internet through VPNs, known locally as “filter-breakers.”
To better understand how this underground system works, I spoke with Farzad, a 46-year-old computer engineer working in software and networking.
"The filtering issue dates back to the emergence of the internet in Iran. I myself participated in the first filtering congress in 2003 in Tabriz [city]. From day one, the government didn't like people using the open internet,” he said. “Iran has continued for over 20 years to organize an internal internet, and with Chinese assistance has been able to advance. But Iran's project to close the open internet faces obstacles in the short term. It can't fulfill some needs.”
Farzad said VPN providers generally fall into two groups.
The first group, he explained, consists of small IT teams “who try to make free VPN to help people and activists.”
“I myself help that group,” he said. He added that Iranian authorities cannot fully stop such groups.
“We work voluntarily… and are connected together - we're also very few. During the 12-day war, several people from that group were arrested,” he said, referring to the Iran-Israel war in June.
The second group, he said, includes individuals “who have access to open internet in some government places, government media agencies, or other places, and secretly tunnel traffic through their servers to themselves.”
“Based on that, they make limited VPN and sell it,” he added.
According to Farzad, the largest part of the market is controlled by “some mafia within the army and security facilities who systematically have access to equipment and sell it. Their purpose is profit and money."
I asked him how authorities could simultaneously restrict internet access for security reasons while government officials provide access underground.
