The Kurdish people in Syria constitute a distinct, non-Arab nation with a unique identity, culture, language, and history. Comprising 15 to 20 percent of the population, Kurds are an integral component of Syria’s diversity.
Historically, Syria itself was a cradle of Kurdish literary renaissance. It was in Damascus that the exiled Kurdish intellectual Jaladat Ali Badirkhan published Hawar, a seminal magazine that ran for 57 issues between 1932 and 1943. As the first media outlet published in Kurmanji Kurdish, Hawar played a critical role in the modernization of the language and introduced the Latin-based "Badirkhan Alphabet," which remains the global standard today.
The fact that the modern Kurdish alphabet was born in Damascus completely dismantles the centralist narrative that the Kurdish language is a foreign or separatist element. Rather, it demonstrates that Kurdish linguistic heritage is inextricably intertwined with Syrian history. Because its inaugural issue was released on May 15, 1932, the date has been celebrated annually since 2006 as Kurdish Language Day.
Despite this rich, shared history, for decades under the Baathist regime (1971 - 2024), this population faced severe systemic oppression aimed at forced assimilation into a broader Arab identity.
Tens of thousands were imprisoned, tortured, or killed, while hundreds of thousands were stripped of their citizenship, denying them access to education, property, and societal participation. This prolonged policy deliberately prioritized Arabic while strictly prohibiting the Kurdish language in speech, writing, publishing, and even in naming newborns.
To permanently dismantle this legacy of erasure, the foundation of a stable and equitable post-conflict Syria relies heavily on the fundamental recognition of linguistic rights. Recognizing Kurdish merely as a “national language” is insufficient; it must be constitutionally recognized as an official language. This distinction is not semantic, but constitutional and operational.
Legal contradiction
Presidential Decree No. 13 of 2026, issued by interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa on January 16, designated Kurdish a “national language” and permitted its teaching in schools in areas where Kurds constitute a significant proportion of the population, including northeast Syria (Rojava)
While the decree was described as historic - the first formal recognition of Kurdish rights since Syria’s independence in 1946 - it immediately exposed a critical legal contradiction: Article 4 of Syria’s interim constitution still designates Arabic as the sole official language of the state. The decree and the interim constitution are in direct conflict, and that conflict has not been resolved.
Accordingly, the Kurdish-led Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) responded that “rights are not protected by temporary decrees, but through permanent constitutions that express the will of the people.” This position is legally precise since presidential decrees are reversible administrative acts that can be revoked at any time by executive decision. They are not constitutional guarantees.
Without amending Article 4 and enshrining official status in the permanent constitution, Kurdish linguistic rights remain conditional and revocable. This designation is critical to ensure that Kurdish is not relegated to symbolic status but is actively utilized as a primary medium for interim government operations, educational systems, and the judiciary.
The most immediate arena for this operationalization is the educational system, where mother-tongue education is a non-negotiable red line.
Historically, marginalized populations have faced systemic linguistic suppression. Reversing this trajectory requires robust structural guarantees. Following the initial withdrawal of state forces from Rojava in 2012, Kurdish-led administrations took the foundational step of integrating Kurdish into local schools.
Today, a decade of successful Kurdish-language education in the Kurdish-led enclave demonstrates that the ability for students to learn and interact in their native language is not only logistically viable but also a basic human right and a necessary step for cultural preservation. Decree No. 13, however, represents a significant regression on this front.
Rather than building on a decade of Kurdish-medium schooling, the decree effectively rolls back the linguistic rights Syrian Kurds had exercised since 2012, offering in their place just two hours of optional Kurdish courses per week in select geographic areas. This is not recognition: it is a demotion. Kurdish children who were educated in their mother tongue are now being told that language is a weekly elective.
The January 29 integration agreement did include Article 11, which recognized diplomas granted under the DAANES’s multilingual education system - an important but insufficient concession. The Kurdish Peace Institute has called for a follow-up decree explicitly defining “national language” to include the right to use Kurdish as a language of instruction, and for the Constitutional Declaration to be amended accordingly.
This call for constitutional alignment highlights a critical legal gap as the distinction between a “national” and an “official” language is not rhetorical. It is the difference between recognition and operationalization.
A national language may carry cultural prestige, however, an official language carries legal force. It governs which language is used in courts, in public administration, on identity documents, in parliamentary proceedings, and in state-funded education.
Integration process
Moreover, Syria’s interim constitution, as noted by independent analysts, raises unanswered questions. Does Kurdish’s designation as a national language mean that passports and government IDs will be issued bilingually? Will Kurdish be used in courts in Kurdish cities, including Hasaka or Qamishli? Will administration in majority-Kurdish areas conduct official business in Kurdish?
The answer to all of these questions, under the current constitutional framework, is no, because Article 4 remains unamended. Symbolic decrees cannot substitute for constitutional architecture, which is why the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) has outright rejected the interim constitution as illegitimate, describing it as a document that “reinforces domination” rather than pluralism.
Senior Kurdish political figure Salih Muslim (1951 - 2026), who recently passed away, clearly stated that Damascus’s offers amount to individual promises rather than guaranteed rights.
“They say you must abandon your weapons, and then they will give you some rights, like studying in your own language.” This framing - rights as rewards for disarmament - is incompatible with any serious commitment to constitutional pluralism.
Instead of conditional rewards, a comparative analysis of international models demonstrates that institutionalizing linguistic diversity acts as a catalyst for economic success and social cohesion. A robust structural framework is required to guarantee these rights.
A state-funded Kurdish Language Academy must be established to standardize the language, develop comprehensive educational curricula, and ensure its formalized use across civic sectors. In this endeavor, the Qamishli-based Rojava University, which already possesses an established Kurdish language faculty, should serve as one of the major foundational institutions working to develop the Kurdish language in Rojava and throughout Syria.
Implementing positive discrimination policies will further address historical injustices by ensuring equitable educational development and representation for the Kurdish population.
The justification for such robust policies extends beyond domestic borders, as the Kurdish struggle is underscored by immense sacrifices for global security, notably the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) losing over 15,000 men and women in efforts to dismantle the territorial stronghold of the Islamic State (ISIS).
The international community, particularly Western states, holds a moral obligation to support Kurdish linguistic rights. The world’s advanced countries are those that value diversity, multiculturalism, and multilingualism.
Crucially, there are also significant economic benefits to this approach. Pluralistic states often attract more foreign investment because their institutionalized diversity fosters regional stability and localized economic growth. Tying linguistic rights directly to post-conflict interim governance structures is a highly effective mechanism to accelerate Syria’s broader economic recovery.
International models consistently demonstrate that institutionalizing linguistic diversity strengthens, rather than fragments, national unity. In Canada, official bilingualism empowers provinces like Quebec to preserve their distinct linguistic and cultural heritage within a unified national framework. Spain recognizes Catalans, Basques, and Galicians as distinct nationalities with co-official languages.
Most notably, neighboring Iraq provides a direct regional blueprint: the 2005 Iraqi Constitution officially recognizes Kurdish alongside Arabic as state languages, demonstrating that Arab and Kurdish linguistic governance can successfully coexist within a single state.
Applying these regional and international precedents is an urgent necessity as of May 2026.
International engagement
Following the landmark January 29 integration agreement and subsequent meetings in Damascus between Kurdish leadership under SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi and interim President Sharaa, officializing the Kurdish language has emerged as the central issue determining the success of national reunification.
The broader territorial and political context is stark. Following the January 2026 clashes, the SDF lost the majority of the territory it had held at the start of the year. What remains under Kurdish governance is primarily concentrated around Qamishli, Hasaka, and Kobane - areas with the highest Kurdish population density.
The Kurdish-led administration and newly integrated officials, including Hasaka governor Noureddin Ahmed, have explicitly stated that comprehensive Kurdish school curricula serve as the ultimate guarantee for the integration deal’s success.
Currently, proposals raised on behalf of the interim government - offering Kurdish as a weekly elective or translating the national curriculum into an optional track for Kurdish regions - fall critically short of full institutionalization. It is clear that, in the absence of a constitutional framework, concessions on language remain discretionary and reversible.
Moreover, cultural recognition must not be conflated with political or legal recognition, since accepting Kurdish as a national language does not imply recognition of Kurds as a constituent group within the state with protected collective rights.
According to reliable sources, France has emerged as a key international actor pressing for substantive guarantees. French diplomatic pressure was instrumental in making Kurdish-language education a core clause of the January 29 integration agreement.
Paris has also worked actively to ensure Kurdish rights are enshrined in Syria’s new constitution and has emphasized the need for effective Kurdish participation in the committee drafting that document. A high-level joint delegation of French state and parliamentary officials visited Qamishli, where it pledged to work to protect the political and civil rights of residents.
France’s approach - linking Kurdish rights directly to counter-terrorism cooperation and regional stability - provides a model that other international actors should replicate.
As Syria moves toward drafting its permanent constitution and holding elections, Kurdish leadership must recognize that the window for securing constitutionally binding linguistic rights is narrow. Accepting optional curricula and reversible decrees as substitutes for constitutional guarantees would be a historic error with consequences that would outlast any current interim administration in Damascus.
To ensure this historic error is avoided, the international community must move beyond passive observation as Damascus negotiations progress. The United Nations and key Western diplomatic bodies currently mediating or observing this transition must explicitly endorse a constitutional framework for linguistic equity.
Recognizing the Kurdish language is not a domestic fringe issue, rather it is a fundamental prerequisite for a stable, democratic Syria.
France and the United States, which played a direct role in brokering the January 29 agreement, must use their leverage to demand that Kurdish linguistic rights be constitutionally protected in the permanent constitution, not managed through revocable presidential decrees.
The establishment of a pluralistic Syria built on justice, democracy, and linguistic equality is the only viable path to securing lasting regional peace. For Kurdish leadership, this is not merely a cultural aspiration; it is the most durable security guarantee available.